2024-06-13 Notice of Filing (Alexander) June 13, 2024 (2024)

Case

Jul 29, 2024 |Abandoned Motor Vehicle Petition |Abandoned Motor Vehicle Petition |24-M-32089

Case

Aug 28, 2024 |Abandoned Motor Vehicle Petition |Abandoned Motor Vehicle Petition |24-M-36745

Case

WILLARD WRECKER vs 2013 MERCEDES-BENZ S550

Aug 28, 2024 |Abandoned Motor Vehicle Petition |Abandoned Motor Vehicle Petition |24-M-36845

Case

Jul 24, 2024 |Abandoned Motor Vehicle Petition |Abandoned Motor Vehicle Petition |24-M-31412

Case

WILLARD WRECKER vs 2014 NISSAN JUKE

Aug 28, 2024 |Abandoned Motor Vehicle Petition |Abandoned Motor Vehicle Petition |24-M-36837

Case

BIRCH VS ZADA et al

Aug 28, 2024 |Brown, Carla |Tort - Auto Tort* |Tort - Auto Tort* |24-C-07989-S3

Case

MURAGWA VS ARMOUR et al

Jul 25, 2024 |Bratton, Shawn F |Tort - Auto Tort* |Tort - Auto Tort* |24-C-06842-S2

Case

WILLARD WRECKER vs 2006 TOYOTA AVALON

Aug 28, 2024 |Abandoned Motor Vehicle Petition |Abandoned Motor Vehicle Petition |24-M-36824

Case

COPPEAK VS NUNEZ et al

Aug 28, 2024 |Cope, Veronica |Tort - Auto Tort* |Tort - Auto Tort* |24-C-07985-S6

Ruling

LILLIAN ZACKY VS ELI ALBEK

Aug 26, 2024 |6/18/2022 |24SMCV00256

Case Number: 24SMCV00256 Hearing Date: August 26, 2024 Dept: I The court has reviewed the file in this matter. The court believes that it is not fully clear whether the court can vacate the judgment of another judge, at least if that other judge is still on the bench and hearing cases. In the instant matter, the judicial officer is Commissioner Davis, who remains on the bench and in the same assignment as she had when the judgment was issued. The court is aware that there is authority suggesting that any judicial officer can vacate a void judgment, which would suggest that this court does have the power to vacate the judgment in the small claims matter. But those cases were often where the jurisdictions were differenteither a Superior Court vacating a Municipal Court judgment (something that cannot happen after unification) or a judgment from another county. It also more often happens when the court is being asked to enforce a void judgment rather than vacate it. Here, the court is being asked to vacate a judgment of a sitting judicial officer of equal dignity in the same county. Even if this court does have the power to vacate the judgment, the court believes that, in the exercise of its discretion, it ought not to do so if the same remedy can be sought before the judicial officer that issued the judgment. Therefore, plaintiff must bring a motion to vacate the judgment before Commissioner Davis. The court is aware that plaintiffs counsel claims to have tried to file a motion vacating the judgment in the department that issued the judgment but was rebuffed. The court suggests that plaintiff try again and make sure that the motion is in proper form. The court is confident that if filed in proper format, the pleading will be received and at least forwarded to Commissioner Davis. If, for some reason, Commissioner Davis elects not to consider the matter, then plaintiff may press the action in this court. If Commissioner Davis does hear the matter, this court is unlikely to second-guess her decision because it would seem that plaintiffs remedy would be in the Court of Appeal. (The court notes that it is not being asked to enforce the judgment, nor will the judgment be enforced. According to defendants, the judgment has been fully satisfied.) The court has reviewed the merits a bit given the nature of the motion to dismiss. In other words, if the judgment is plainly not void, then the court would absolutely lack the power to overturn it and the motion to dismiss would be granted based on principles of res judicata, which would make things easy. To be more precise about the res judicata, while the original complaint had a number of causes of action that could not be adjudicated in the small claims court, all of those causes of action fail on their face if the small claims judgment stands. For example, it is not elder abuse to bring a successful lawsuit against an elderly party. Therefore, as long as the small claims judgment remains on the books, those causes of action are doomed to fail because doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel would bar them all. The amended complaint, in contrast, merely seeks to vacate the small claims judgment, but as stated before, this court believes that matter should be brought, if possible, to the judge who issued the judgment. As to the merits of the motion to dismiss, there is at least a plausible opposition. The court did not see a proof of service in the file showing service of the small claims action on plaintiff here. A judgment is void if there was never any service on the defendant and if that is plain from the judgment roll alone. Such appears to be the case here at first blush. But having said that, the court is unaware of the trial record. That problem might well have been cured at trial if defendant here (plaintiff there) submitted a proof of service at trial. While such a proof of service does not appear in the file, that could be more in the nature of a clerical error than a truly substantive one (which is why this is better decided by the court issuing the judgment). If the judgment is not void based on a lack of service apparent from the judgment roll, then the issue is whether there is extrinsic fraud. The court makes no comment on that issue other than to say that, again, the court issuing the judgment would be in the better position to make that determination. The court believes that the best avenue, therefore, is to STAY the instant matter. True, the court could construe the motion to dismiss as a demurrer, sustain the demurrer with leave to amend, allow the other causes of action to return, then sustain the demurrer based on the small claims judgment. It just seems like a lot of paperwork that is really needless. Rather, the court believes that the right thing to do is keep the instant case on ice and let plaintiff attempt to vacate the judgment with the court that rendered the judgment. If such a motion is brought and granted, then this court can move on from there. If the motion is brought and denied, then the likely outcome will be to dismiss the instant action. As stated above, the court believes that if a motion to vacate is brought in proper form in the proper court it will be accepted for filing by the clerk and considered by Commissioner Davis. That does not mean it will be granted, and it must be in proper form as allowed by the Code of Civil Procedure. And the court is making no comment as to whether such a motion is procedurally barred for one reason or another (which would be something Commissioner Davis would decide). The court is merely saying that the issuing court is the better court to make those determinations. Once there is a determination there, the court here will better know what to do. Accordingly, this case is STAYED. The motion to compel is similarly STAYED. The court will set a status conference and discuss the date with counsel.

Ruling

ELIZONDO, AARON vs KCB VENTURES INC a)

Aug 29, 2024 |CV-21-001167

CV-21-001167 – ELIZONDO, AARON vs KCB VENTURES INC – a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant, KCB Ventures, Inc’s Responses to Request for Production, Set Nos. Two and Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions in the amount of $2,250.00 – GRANTED; b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant, Adcomm, Inc’s Responses to Requests for Production, Set Nos. Two and Three; Request for Monetary Sanctions in the amount of $2,250.00 – GRANTED.(a) The Court finds that Defendant KCB Ventures Inc. failed to timely respond to Plaintiff’s Request for Production propounded on November 21, 2022, and January 10, 2023, in spite of indications that said responses would be forthcoming.The Court accordingly finds that Defendant has waived all objections to said discovery including those based on work product and privilege. Civ. Proc. Code § 2031.300 (a) and (b)).Defendant is therefore ordered to provide code-compliant, objection-free responses to said discovery within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this order.The Court also finds that said failure to respond is without substantial justification. The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to monetary sanctions of $100.00 for attorney’s fees reasonably incurred in bringing this motion. Said sanctions are payable to Plaintiff’s Counsel within ten (10) days of the date of this order. (Civ Proc. Code §§2031.300(c); 2023, 010 (h); CA ST CIVIL RULES Rule 3.1348 (a)).(b) The Court finds that Defendant ADCOMM Inc. failed to timely respond to Plaintiff’s Request for Production propounded on November 21, 2022, and January 10, 2023, in spite of indications that said responses would be forthcoming.The Court accordingly finds that Defendant has waived all objections to said discovery including those based on work product and privilege. Civ. Proc. Code § 2031.300 (a) and (b)).Defendant is therefore ordered to provide code-compliant, objection-free responses to said discovery within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this order.The Court also finds that said failure to respond is without substantial justification and accordingly finds that Plaintiff is entitled to monetary sanctions of $1000.00 for attorney’s fees reasonably incurred in bringing this motion. Said sanctions are payable to Plaintiff’s Counsel within ten (10) days of the date of this order. (Civ Proc. Code §§2031.300(c), 2023, 010 (h); CA ST CIVIL RULES Rule 3.1348 (a)).

Ruling

GERARDO DIAZ, , ET AL. VS NEW CENTURY INVESTMENT, LLC

Aug 27, 2024 |23STCV01891

Case Number: 23STCV01891 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: 11 The tentative is as follows: The Motion for Preliminary Approval set for hearing on August 27, 2024, must be continued for counsel to provide a settlement agreement which is properly formatted and filed. The Stipulation of Settlement filed with the Court on April 29, 2024 has a file formatting error such that any copying of the document via "copy-paste" function results in illegible material. In addition, the text is not searchable. All documents electronically filed must comply with the Rules of Court, including 2.256(b)(3) which specifies: "The document must be text searchable when technologically feasible without impairment of the document's image." The same search functionality is required by this Court's First Amended General Order re electronic filing, filed May 3, 2019. Counsel is to provide a properly formatted, fully text searchable settlement agreement before the Court can proceed with preliminary approval. The continued hearing date is ________ at ____ a.m. with updated/corrected papers filed no later than ______.

Ruling

ROSALES, GEETANGALY PRASAD vs TURLOCK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

Aug 27, 2024 |CV-23-003274

CV-23-003274 – ROSALES, GEETANGALY PRASAD vs TURLOCK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT – Defendant’s Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint – OVERRULED.Defendant's Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint for Damages is OVERRULED. Preliminarily, Defendant’s reply brief’s table of contents and table of cases appear unrelated to this case.“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) The Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)Defendant’s primary argument is that Government Code § 831.7 grants them immunity as a matter of law.Section 831.7 grants immunity when a participant is involved in a “hazardous recreational activity” which includes “[w]ater contact activities.” Perry v. East Bay Regional Park Dist. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1 holds (probably in dicta) that swimming without a lifeguard is in fact definitionally a hazardous recreational activity under the code.Nonetheless, the district may have an obligation to its students – probably even its trespassing students – under Constantinescu v. Conejo Valley Unified School District, (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1466. It cites with approval the California Law Revision Committee’s statement that “where it is reasonably foreseeable that persons to whom a lower standard of care is applicable – such as children – may be exposed to a substantial risk of injury from the property, the public entity should be required to take reasonable precautions,” offering an example: “Thus, a public entity may be expected to fence a swimming pool[.]”Here, there was fencing, but the question of the adequacy of the fencing is addressed in the Second Amended Complaint. It also alleges that a school function, a football game was in progress. These allegations defeat the demurrer. Defendant is ordered to file an answer within 15 days of this ruling.Defendant asserts that Bartell v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Sch. Dist. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 492 renders Plaintiff a trespasser ineligible to sue. But Bartell specifically uses the language that this exemption applies when the student is on the premises “apart from school-related activities and functions which require persons to be on school grounds.Defendant aptly cites to Bartell at 499-500: Even though a harm may be foreseeable, as under plaintiffs' pleadings it was here, a concomitant duty to forestall and prevent the harm does not automatically follow. (Internal Citations Omitted.) Rather, the question is whether the risk of harm is sufficiently high and the amount of activity needed to protect against harm sufficiently low to bring the duty into existence, a threshold issue of law which requires the court to consider such additional factors as the burdensomeness of the duty on defendant, the closeness of the relationship between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury, the moral blame attached to defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury, and the prevention of future harm.Here, such an analysis is different than Bartell’s, which would have required a full lockdown. In this case, prevention would have involved having a person present or fixing known issues prior to the swimming accident. If there had not been a simultaneous event going on, Defendant would have been immune.Defendant cites to cases and asserts “The Courts are very clear that the duty of a school to its students ends after school hours unless it is a school sponsored athletic practice.” This is not at all clear to this particular Court. Consider a simple case where a drama club production is put on in the school auditorium after hours. The auditorium floor has some standing slick spot where a student – whether in or out of the club - trips and falls. It seems unlikely that this is exempted.This is a close case at the demurrer stage, but I find that Defendant is not facially exempted from liability based on Plaintiff’s pleadings. Defendant is to file an Answer within 15 days. The matter is set for Case Management Conference on November 18, 2024, at 2:00 p.m. in Department 21.

Ruling

HUGO MARTINEZ, AN INDIVIDUAL VS FITNESS INTERNATIONAL, LLC., A BUSINESS ENTITY

Aug 27, 2024 |24STCV06089

Case Number: 24STCV06089 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: 61 HUGO MARTINEZ, AN INDIVIDUAL vs FITNESS INTERNATIONAL, LLC., A BUSINESS ENTITY TENTATIVE Defendant Fitness International, LLCs Motions to Compel Responses to Form and Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production, and to Deem Matters admitted against Plaintiff Hugo Martinez are GRANTED. Sanctions are awarded against Plaintiff in the amount of $1,990.00.Defendant to give notice. Raymond Ghermezians Motion to be Relieved as Counsel for Plaintiff Hugo Martinez is GRANTED, effective upon moving counsel filing with the court proof of service of a copy of the signed order amended to include the four motions to compel set for August 27, 2024 on the client, as set forth in Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1362(e), as well as the notice of ruling as to those motions and the continuance date of the Case Management Conference. Mr. Ghermezian to give notice. I. MOTION TO COMPEL & DEEM ADMITTED A propounding party may demand a responding party to produce documents that are in their possession, custody or control. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.010.) A party may likewise conduct discovery by propounding interrogatories to another party to be answered under oath. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.010, subd. (a).) The responding party must respond to the production demand either by complying, by representing that the party lacks the ability to comply, or by objecting to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210.) The responding party must respond to the interrogatories by answering or objecting. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.210, subd. (a).) If the responding party fails to serve timely responses, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses to the production demand and interrogatories. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, 2031.300.) A party who fails to serve a timely response to interrogatories or a demand for inspection waives any objection to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, 2031.300.) Likewise, [a]ny party may obtain discovery . . . by a written request that any other party to the action admit the genuineness of specified documents, or the truth of specified matters of fact, opinion relating to fact, or application of law to fact. A request for admission may relate to a matter that is in controversy between the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.010.) If a party fails to serve a timely response to requests for admissions, [t]he requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280 subd. (b).) Defendant Fitness International, LLC (Defendant) propounded interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admission upon Plaintiff Hugo Martinez (Plaintiff) on April 11, 2024. (Meikle Decl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff failed to serve responses by the due date, and has still not presented responses despite attempts to meet and confer. (Meikle Decl. ¶¶ 36.) No opposition to the motions has been filed. Defendant has shown that discovery was propounded upon Plaintiff, and no responses were served. Thus the motions to compel and deem admitted are GRANTED.II. SANCTIONS The prevailing party on a motion to compel is generally entitled to monetary sanctions, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.290, 2031.300.) Sanctions are also mandatory against a party whose failure to serve responses to requests for admission makes the motion necessary. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280, subd. (c).) Sanctions are awarded for the purpose to remedy the harm due to the noncompliance as well as to ensure future compliance. Here, Defendant seeks $810.00 in connection with each motion, for a total of $3,240.00, representing two hours of attorney work on each motion at a rate of $250 per hour, an hour to attend hearing on each motion, and a $60 filing fee for each motion. (Meikle Decl. ¶ 7.) As these motions are to be heard on the same date, three hours and $750 sought in connection with time attending the hearing are duplicative and non-compensable. Further, the court finds 1.5 hours per motion to be reasonable given the template used for each declaration. The motions are unopposed. Sanctions are thus awarded against Plaintiff in the amount of $1,990.00. III. MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL The present motions pertain to attorney Raymond Ghermezian, counsel for Plaintiff Hugo Martinez. The declaration that Ghermezian provides with the motion states there have been irreconcilable differences of opinion between Plaintiff and counsel, leading to a breakdown of the attorney-client relationship. Ghermezian states certain significant issues surfaced related to the prosecution of this case, which to date remain unresolved. (Ghermezian Decl. at p. 1.) The motion includes a proof of service and a proposed order, albeit without listing the four motions to compel set for hearing August 27, 2024, which were filed before the present motion. No trial date has been set. This court previously heard this matter on August 9, 2024, and continued hearing on the motion until this court could hear the motions to compel and deem admitted filed against Plaintiff by Defendant. These motions are discussed above. Raymond Ghermezians Motion to be Relieved as Counsel for Plaintiff Hugo Martinez is GRANTED, effective upon moving counsel filing with the court proof of service of a copy of the signed order amended to include the four motions to compel set for August 27, 2024 on the client, as set forth in Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1362(e), as well as the notice of ruling as to those motions.

Ruling

Vincelli vs. Hartnell Self Storage, LLC

Aug 28, 2024 |23CV-0201409

VINCELLI VS. HARTNELL SELF STORAGE, LLCCase Number: 23CV-0201409Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions: An Order to Show Cause Re: Monetary Sanctionsissued on July 18, 2024 to Plaintiff Larry Dean Vincelli, in pro per, for failure to appear at the MandatorySettlement Conference on July 15, 2024, failure to timely file a Settlement Conference Statement, and failure totimely prosecute. Plaintiff filed a written response on August 16, 2024 that provides sufficient excuse for thenonappearance. The Order to Show Cause is DISCHARGED. No appearance is necessary on today’scalendar.****************************************************************************************** 9:00 a.m. – Review Hearings******************************************************************************************

Ruling

34-2022-00314140-CU-PO-GDS

Aug 28, 2024 |Unlimited Civil (Other Personal Injury/Propert...) |34-2022-00314140-CU-PO-GDS

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO34-2022-00314140-CU-PO-GDS: Heriberto Mosqueda vs. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.08/29/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents from Jagdip Singh in Department 54Tentative RulingPlaintiffs Heriberto Mosqueda, Sr. and Gladis Paola Barrera’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) motionfor to compel Defendant Jagdip Sing (“Singh”) to provide further responses to Plaintiffs’Request for Production of Documents, Set Two, is ruled upon as follows.BackgroundThe Court refers the parties to its background discussion in the ruling on Plaintiffs’ motion tocompel as to FedEx on today’s calendar for the general background of this dispute. Specificallyas to Singh, the Court notes that the discovery set consisted of two requests for production ofdocuments (Request Nos. 49-50). At issue in this motion is Request No. 49, which soughtSingh’s phone records for the date of the incident.DiscussionThe Court again refers to its ruling on Plaintiffs’ motion to compel as to FedEx on today’scalendar regarding Singh’s arguments that Plaintiffs’ motion is mooted by Singh’s belatedservice of further responses and that Plaintiffs’ filed this motion too hastily before fully meetingand conferring. The Court’s analysis in that ruling applies equally here.A party may respond to a request for production of documents by any of the following: (1) astatement of compliance; (2) a representation of an inability to comply; or (3) an objection.(Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.210(a).)As set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230, “A representation of inability tocomply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm thata diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with thatdemand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because theparticular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, orstolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the respondingparty. The statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organizationknown or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or categoryof item.”As noted above, Request No. 49 sought Singh’s cell phone records from the date of the incident.Singh responded, “Defendant is unable to comply with this request because no responsivedocuments are in his possession, custody, or control.” (Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement, p. 2:12-14.) This response fails to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230, as it does notaffirm that a diligent search and reasonable inquiry was made, does not specify why or how Page 1 of 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO34-2022-00314140-CU-PO-GDS: Heriberto Mosqueda vs. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.08/29/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents from Jagdip Singh in Department 54Singh does not possess responsive documents, and does not identify any person or organizationknown or believed to have the documents. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED.DispositionPlaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses is GRANTED. Singh has already served furtherresponses, so the Court will not order the responses be re-served. However, the Court expressesno opinion as to the sufficiency of the further responses.Plaintiffs also request monetary sanctions in the amount of $985, representing one hour ofattorney time at $750 per hour, one hour of paralegal time at $175 per hour, and the $60 filingfee for this motion. The Court finds the amount requested reasonable. Thus, Plaintiffs’ requestfor sanctions is GRANTED. Sanctions are imposed against Singh and his counsel jointly andseverally. Sanctions shall be paid by no later than September 20, 2024, and if not paid by thatdate, Plaintiffs may prepare for the Court’s signature a formal order granting the sanctions,which may then be enforced as a separate judgment. (Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40Cal.App.4th 608, 615.)This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (CodeCiv. Proc. § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)NOTICE:Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on thiscalendar must comply with the following procedure:To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law andMotion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before thehearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requestingparty shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oralargument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument;and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and thatopposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If norequest for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely eithertelephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with noticeto the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Althoughremote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for Page 2 of 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO34-2022-00314140-CU-PO-GDS: Heriberto Mosqueda vs. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.08/29/2024 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents from Jagdip Singh in Department 54non-evidentiary civil hearings. The Department 53/54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear onZoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NOCOURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporterservices at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules ofCourt, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy forOfficial Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website athttps://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved OfficialReporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.pdf.A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to besigned by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using areporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiverand requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party witha Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearingor at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerkwill forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. Page 3 of 3

Ruling

Christopher Neimier vs Merced Police Department

Aug 29, 2024 |24CV-00211

24CV-00211 Christopher Neimier v. Merced Police DepartmentOrder to Show Cause re SanctionsAppearance required. Parties who wish to appear remotely must contact the clerk of thecourt at (209) 725-4111 to seek permission and arrange for a remote appearance. Appearto address the failure to appear at the July 22, 2024, Case Management Conference.

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MATTHEWS VS EMCOR FACILITIES SERVICES INC et al

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HATFIELD VS GA CARTERSVILLE SNF LLC et al

Jul 23, 2024 |Colvin, Ronda S. |Tort - Medical Malpractice Tort* |Tort - Medical Malpractice Tort* |24-C-06765-S4

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LIU VS MCMANUS

Jun 10, 2024 |Dove, Erica K. |Tort - Auto Tort* |Tort - Auto Tort* |24-C-05229-S5

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FARMER VS WAFFLE HOUSE INC et al

Oct 26, 2023 |Cope, Veronica |Tort - General* |Tort - General* |23-C-07967-S6

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GAYTON VS REUTER

Mar 19, 2024 |Bratton, Shawn F |Tort - Auto Tort* |Tort - Auto Tort* |24-C-02444-S2

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JARAYSI VS SAMBRONEDARKINS

Jul 19, 2024 |Colvin, Ronda S. |Tort - Auto Tort* |Tort - Auto Tort* |24-C-06681-S4

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JOHNSON VS LOPEZ

May 02, 2024 |Colvin, Ronda S. |Tort - Auto Tort* |Tort - Auto Tort* |24-C-04019-S4

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GOINES, Jr. VS AMERICAN PLUMBING PROFESSIONALS INC ET AL

Mar 21, 2024 |Smith, Jaletta L. |Tort - Auto Tort* |Tort - Auto Tort* |24-C-02583-S7